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FINITE APPROXIMATIONS TO COHERENT CHOICE
MATTHIAS C. M. TROFFAES
Abstract. This paper studies and bounds the effects of approximating loss functions and
credal sets on choice functions, under very weak assumptions. In particular, the credal set is
assumed to be neither convex nor closed. The main result is that the effects of approximation
can be bounded, although in general, approximation of the credal set may not always be prac-
tically possible. In case of pairwise choice, I demonstrate how the situation can be improved
by showing that only approximations of the extreme points of the closure of the convex hull
of the credal set need to be taken into account, as expected.
1. Introduction
Classical decision theory tells a decision maker to choose that option which maximises his
expected utility. A generalisation of this principle is compelling when the probabilities and
utilities relevant to the problem are not well known. Choice functions are one such generalisation,
and select a set of optimal options: instead of pointing to a single solution based on possibly
wrong assumptions, choice functions provide a set of optimal options. The decision maker can
then investigate further if the set is too large, or not, if for instance the optimal set is a singleton,
or if a single option from the set stands out from the rest by other arguments.
However, in modelling decision problems, we often afford ourselves the luxury of infinite spaces
and infinite sets, making those problems sometimes hard to solve analytically. In such cases we
must resort to computers, and these cannot handle random variables on infinite spaces, let alone
arbitrary infinite sets of probabilities. Hence, in that case we must approximate our infinite sets
by finite ones. By taking the finite sets sufficiently large, hopefully the approximation reflects
the true result accurately. This paper confirms this intuition when modelling choice functions
induced by arbitrary (not necessarily convex) sets of probabilities and a single cardinal utility,
extending similar results known in classical decision theory [5, 11].
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces notation, and briefly reviews the theory
of coherent choice functions and their role in decision theory. In Section 3 the building blocks
for a theory of approximation are introduced, along with some useful results on what they imply
for loss functions, sets of probabilities, and expected utility. The main part of the paper begins
in Section 4, studying and bounding the effects of approximation on coherent choice functions.
Section 5 improves the results of the previous section for pairwise choice. Section 6 concludes
the paper. Some essential but technical results on approximating the standard simplex in Rn
are deferred to an appendix.
2. Choice Functions
Let Ω denote an arbitrary set of states. Bounded random quantities on Ω, i.e. bounded maps
from Ω to R, are also called gambles [18], and will be denoted by f , g, . . . L(Ω) denotes the set
of all gambles on Ω. Finitely additive probability measures, or briefly probability charges [2], are
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denoted by P , Q, . . . and P(Ω) denotes the set of all probability charges on the power set ℘(Ω)
of Ω.
In a decision problem, we desire to choose an optimal option d from a set D of options.
Choosing d induces an uncertain reward r from a set R of rewards, with probability charge
µd(·|w) over ℘(R), depending on the outcome of the uncertain state w ∈ Ω. For each w ∈ Ω,
µd(·|w) is a lottery over R, and as a function of w, µd(·|·) : w 7→ µd(·|w) is a horse lottery or act.
If we model our belief about states and rewards by a probability charge P on ℘(Ω) and a state
dependent utility function U(·|w) on R, then utility theory [17, 1, 4] tells us to choose a decision
d which maximises the expected utility, or prevision:
E(d) =
∫
Ω
(∫
R
U(r|w) dµd(r|w)
)
dP (w)
=
∫
Ω
fd(w) dP (w)
where fd(w) =
∫
R
U(r|w) dµd(r|w) is the gamble associated with decision d, and the integrals
are Dunford integrals [2]. For simplicity, in this paper, we assume U(r|w) to be bounded, i.e.
sup
r,w
U(r|w) − inf
r,w
U(r|w) < +∞
Among other things, this ensures that relative approximation can be defined, as in Section 3,
without technical complications.
A decision which maximises expected utility is called a Bayes decision for the decision problem
(Ω, D, P, U).
However, if we are not sure about the probability of all events and the utility of all rewards,
a more reliable design is to use a family (Pα, Uα)α∈ℵ of probability-utility pairs (where ℵ is an
arbitrary index set), and to elicit from D those options which maximise expected utility with
respect to at least one of the pairs (Pα, Uα). First, for each α ∈ ℵ, let
Eα(d) =
∫
Ω
fαd (w) dPα(w)
where fαd (w) =
∫
R Uα(r|w) dµd(r|w) is the gamble associated with decision d and model α ∈ ℵ.
Then we define:
Definition 1. A decision d ∈ D is called an optimal decision for the decision problem (Ω, D, (Pα, Uα)α∈ℵ)
if d belongs to the set
opt(Ω, D, (Pα, Uα)α∈ℵ) = {d ∈ D : (∃α ∈ ℵ)(∀e ∈ D)(Eα(d) ≥ Eα(e))}
=
{
d ∈ D : (∃α ∈ ℵ)
(
Eα(d) = sup
e∈D
Eα(e)
)}
As such, the operator opt selects a set of optimal decisions, namely all decisions which are
Bayes with respect to (Ω, D, Pα, Uα) for at least one α ∈ ℵ. Such an operator is called a choice
function or optimality operator [3, 16].
In case (Pα, Uα)α∈ℵ =M×U for some convex sets M and U , optimality as defined above is
also called E-admissibility [9, Sec. 4.8].
There are many ways to define a choice function starting from a set (Pα, Uα)α∈ℵ (see [9, 14, 18,
8, 16]). The one in Definition 1 satisfies an interesting set of axioms [8, 13], and is the subject of
a representation theorem in case utility is precise and state independent (i.e. if Uα(r|w) depends
neither on α nor on w) and Ω is finite (for infinite Ω the representation theorem is subject to
additional constraints, which preclude merely finitely additive probabilities over Ω) [13].
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For the sake of simplicity, we shall only be concerned about decision problems with precise
and state independent utility functions, i.e. when (Pα, Uα)α∈ℵ = M× {U} with U : R → R a
bounded state independent utility over R and
M = {Pα : α ∈ ℵ}
The set M is called a credal set as it represents our belief about w ∈ Ω. We can identify M
itself as index set, and write
EP (d) =
∫
Ω
fd(w) dP (w)
with fd(w) =
∫
R U(r) dµd(r|w), for any P ∈M.
Finally, defining the loss function L : D × Ω → R as L(d, w) = −fd(w), the expected value
EP (d) is uniquely determined by P and L alone: we need not be concerned explicitly with R,
µd(r|w), and U(r).
3. Approximate Gambles, Probabilities, and Previsions
Let A = {A1, . . . , An} denote a finite partition of Ω. As we approximate Ω by the finite set
A, we also need to approximate decisions, gambles, and probability charges on Ω.
Let ǫ ≥ 0. For a gamble f in L(Ω) and a gamble fˆ in L(A), we shall write f ∼ǫ fˆ if
max
A∈A
sup
w∈A
∣∣∣f(w) − fˆ(A)∣∣∣ ≤ [sup f − inf f ]ǫ
Note that f ∼ǫ fˆ implies af + b ∼ǫ afˆ + b, for any real numbers a and b, a > 0. Therefore, the
relation ∼ǫ is invariant with respect to positive linear transformations of utility: it only depends
on our preferences over lotteries, and not on our particular choice of utility scale.
For a probability charge P in P(Ω), and a probability charge Pˆ in P(A), we shall write P ∼ǫ Pˆ
if ∑
A∈A
∣∣∣P (A)− Pˆ (A)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
Note that this implies |P (A) − Pˆ (A)| ≤ ǫ for any A ∈ ℘(A). Also note the differences between
the definitions of ∼ǫ for gambles and bounded charges.
For a loss function L on D × Ω and a loss function Lˆ on D × A we write L ∼ǫ Lˆ if for all
d ∈ D
fd ∼ǫ fˆd
(with fd(w) = −L(d, w) and fˆd(A) = −Lˆ(d,A)).
For a subset M of P(Ω) and a subset Mˆ of P(A), we write M ∼ǫ Mˆ if for every P in M
there is a Pˆ in Mˆ such that P ∼ǫ Pˆ , and for every Pˆ in Mˆ there is a P inM such that P ∼ǫ Pˆ .
A few useful results about approximations are stated in the next lemmas.
Lemma 2. Assume that D is finite. Then, for every loss function L on D × Ω and every
ǫ > 0, there is a finite partition A of Ω and a loss function Lˆ on D ×A such that L ∼ǫ Lˆ and
|A| ≤ (1 + 1/ǫ)|D|.
Proof. Consider any d in D, and let Rd = sup fd− inf fd. Because fd is bounded, we can embed
the range of fd in k intervals I1, . . . , Ik of length Rdǫ, say
[inf fd, inf fd +Rdǫ), [inf fd +Rdǫ, inf fd + 2Rdǫ), . . . , [inf fd + (k − 1)Rdǫ, inf fd + kRdǫ)
with k such that sup fd ∈ Ik. Therefore, inf fd + (k − 1)Rdǫ ≤ sup fd < inf fd + kRdǫ and hence
k − 1 ≤ 1/ǫ < k. Observe that k is independent of d ∈ D.
The sets A1, . . . , Ak defined by
Aj = f
−1
d (Ij)
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ǫ:
0.2 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01
|D|: 2 1.6 2.1 2.6 3.4 4.0
4 3.1 4.2 5.3 6.8 8.0
8 6.2 8.3 10.6 13.7 16.0
16 12.5 16.7 21.2 27.3 32.1
32 24.9 33.3 42.3 54.6 64.1
Table 1. Upper bound on log10(|A|), i.e. the logarithm of the cardinality of the
finite partition A for various values of precision ǫ > 0 and number of decisions
(see Lemma 2).
form a finite partition Ad = {Aj : Aj 6= ∅} of cardinality |Ad| ≤ k ≤ 1 + 1/ǫ and the gamble
fˆd ∈ L(Ad) defined by
fˆd(Ai) = inf
w∈Ai
fd(w)
satisfies
sup
w∈Aj
∣∣∣fd(w) − fˆd(Aj)∣∣∣ = sup
fd(w)∈Ij
∣∣∣∣fd(w) − inffd(w)∈Ij fd(w)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup Ij − inf Ij = Rdǫ
for all Aj ∈ Ad; hence fd ∼ǫ fˆd. Defining Lˆ(d,A) = −fˆd(A) for all d ∈ D, we have L ∼ǫ Lˆ.
The finite collection of partitions {Ad : d ∈ D} has a smallest common refinement A. Since
each Ad has no more than 1 + 1/ǫ elements, A has no more than (1 + 1/ǫ)|D| elements. Indeed,
two partitions of cardinalities k1 and k2 respectively have a smallest common refinement of
cardinality no more than k1k2. By induction, n partitions of cardinalities k1, . . . , kn have a
smallest common refinement of cardinality no more than
∏n
j=1 kj and hence,
|A| ≤ (1 + 1/ǫ)|D|

Table 1 lists upper bounds on the size of the partition, to ensure L ∼ǫ Lˆ, for various values of
ǫ and |D|, according to Lemma 2.
Let
(
a
b
)
be the binomial coefficient, defined for all real numbers a ≥ b ≥ 0 by(
a
b
)
=
Γ(a+ 1)
Γ(b+ 1)Γ(a− b+ 1)
with Γ the Gamma function.
Lemma 3. For every subset M of P(Ω), every δ > 0, and every finite partition A of Ω, there
is a finite subset Mˆ of P(A) such that M∼δ Mˆ and |Mˆ| ≤
(|A|(1+1/δ)
|A|−1
)
.
Proof. Consider any P in M. Let n = |A| and let the elements of A be A1, . . . , An. Consider
the vector x = (P (A1), . . . , P (An)) in ∆
n. Let N be the smallest natural number such that
N ≥ n/δ.
By Lemma 13 in the appendix, there is a vector y in ∆nN such that
|x− y|1 < n/N ≤ δ
Define Pˆ in P(A) by
Pˆ (Ai) = yi
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δ:
0.2 0.1 0.05
|A|: 4 3.3 4.1 5.0
8 7.9 9.8 11.8
12 12.5 15.5 18.7
16 17.1 21.3 25.6
20 21.8 27.1 32.6
24 26.4 32.9 39.5
28 31.1 38.6 46.5
32 35.8 44.4 53.4
log10(|A|): 0.7 4.4 5.5 6.7
1.4 27.6 34.3 41.3
2.1 144.6 179.5 215.5
2.8 731.3 906.8 1088.2
3.5 3666.1 4544.7 5452.8
4.2 18341.5 22735.9 27277.5
4.9 91719.7 113693.0 136402.5
Table 2. Upper bound on log10(|Mˆ|), i.e. the logarithm of the cardinality of
the finite set of probability charges Mˆ, for various values of precision δ > 0 and
cardinality of the partition |A| (see Lemma 3).
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}—by finite additivity, Pˆ is well defined on ℘(A). By construction, P ∼δ Pˆ
because
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣P (Ai)− Pˆ (Ai)∣∣∣ = |x− y|1 < δ
Approximating each P in M in this manner, the set
Mˆ = {Pˆ : P ∈M}
is finite as each of its elements corresponds to an element of the finite set ∆nN , and therefore
|Mˆ| ≤ |∆nN |. By Lemma 12 in the appendix,
|Mˆ| ≤
(
N + n− 1
N
)
=
(
N + n− 1
n− 1
)
≤
(
n/δ + 1 + n− 1
n− 1
)
=
(
|A|(1 + 1/δ)
|A| − 1
)
The second inequality follows from the fact that
(
a
b
)
is strictly increasing in a, for fixed b (for
integer a and b this follows immediately from Pascal’s triangle; the general case follows from the
properties of the Gamma function). 
Table 2 lists upper bounds on the cardinality of Mˆ on a logarithmic scale, for some values
of |A| and δ. The cardinality grows enormously fast with increasing |A| and 1/δ. Within the
range of Table 2, an exponential trend is obvious. The table shows that the influence of |A| is
much larger than the influence of δ: more precisely, doubling |A| increases |Mˆ| by far more than
halving δ.
Next, we study the effect on the expectation if both gambles and probabilities are ap-
proximated. Let us use the notation EP (f) =
∫
Ω
f(w) dP (w). In the lemma below, assume
0 < ǫ < 1/2.
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Lemma 4. For every finite partition A of Ω, every f ∈ L(Ω), fˆ ∈ L(A), P ∈ P(Ω), and
Pˆ ∈ P(A), the following implications hold. If f ∼ǫ fˆ and P ∼δ Pˆ then∣∣∣EP (f)− EPˆ (fˆ)∣∣∣ ≤ [sup f − inf f ](ǫ+ δ(1 + 2ǫ))
and ∣∣∣EP (f)− EPˆ (fˆ)∣∣∣ ≤ [sup fˆ − inf fˆ ]
(
ǫ
1− 2ǫ
+ δ
)
Proof. Let R = sup f − inf f , Rˆ = sup fˆ − inf fˆ , and write infA f for infw∈A f(w) and supA f for
supw∈A f(w). Then ∣∣∣EP (f)− EPˆ (fˆ)∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
A∈A
(∫
A
f dP − fˆ(A)Pˆ (A)
)∣∣∣∣∣
and since P (A) infA f ≤
∫
A f dP ≤ P (A) supA f , there is an rA ∈ [infA f, supA f ] such that
P (A)rA =
∫
A
f dP , and hence
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
A∈A
(
rAP (A)− fˆ(A)Pˆ (A)
)∣∣∣∣∣
but, because |f(w) − fˆ(A)| ≤ Rǫ for all w ∈ A, and infA f ≤ rA ≤ supA f , it must also
hold that |rA − fˆ(A)| ≤ Rǫ, so
∣∣∣∑A∈A (rAP (A)− fˆ(A)P (A))∣∣∣ ≤ ∑A∈A ∣∣∣rA − fˆ(A)∣∣∣P (A) ≤∑
A∈ARǫP (A) = Rǫ, whence
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
A∈A
(
fˆ(A)P (A) − fˆ(A)Pˆ (A)
)∣∣∣∣∣+Rǫ
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
A∈A
fˆ(A)
(
P (A)− Pˆ (A)
)∣∣∣∣∣+Rǫ
and because
∑
A∈A(P (A) − Pˆ (A)) = 0,
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
A∈A
(fˆ(A)− inf fˆ)
(
P (A)− Pˆ (A)
)∣∣∣∣∣+Rǫ
≤
∑
A∈A
(fˆ(A)− inf fˆ)
∣∣∣P (A)− Pˆ (A)∣∣∣+Rǫ
≤ (sup fˆ − inf fˆ)
∑
A∈A
∣∣∣P (A)− Pˆ (A)∣∣∣ +Rǫ
≤ Rˆδ +Rǫ
and since R(1 + 2ǫ) ≥ Rˆ ≥ R(1− 2ǫ)
≤
{
R(1 + 2ǫ)δ +Rǫ = R(ǫ+ δ(1 + 2ǫ))
Rˆδ + Rˆǫ/(1− 2ǫ) = Rˆ (ǫ/(1− 2ǫ) + δ)

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ǫ
log10
[((1/(ǫ|D|δ)
1/ǫ|D|
)]
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
40
80
120
160
Figure 1. Upper bound on log10 |Mˆ| for various values of ǫ, with ǫ + δ = 0.2
and |D| = 2.
Let us now investigate what is the most optimal choice for ǫ > 0 and δ > 0. The cardinality
of Mˆ is of largest concern as it grows enormously fast with increasing cardinality of the finite
partition A and with increasing precision 1/δ (see Table 2). Therefore, as a first step, let us
see how we can minimise |Mˆ|, assuming a fixed relative error ǫ + δ on the expectation (see
Lemma 4)—omitting higher order terms in ǫ and δ to simplify the analysis.
We wish to minimise the upper bound (neglecting lower order terms)(
(1/(ǫ|D|δ)
1/ǫ|D|
)
on |Mˆ| along the ǫ–δ-curve γ(ǫ, δ) = ǫ + δ = γ∗. Figure 1 demonstrates a typical case: the ǫ–δ-
ratio has a large impact on the upper bound of |Mˆ|. In particular, the curve grows extremely
large for small ǫ, because a small ǫ corresponds to a large partition A, and the cardinality of the
partition has a huge impact on the cardinality of M as shown in Table 2.
4. Approximate Choice
Let us now consider again the decision problem (Ω, D,M, L) with state space Ω, decision
space D, credal set M, and loss function L, and reflect upon how the results in the previous
section could be of use in finding the optimal decisions opt(Ω, D,M, L). Can we still find the
optimal decisions after approximating the loss function L and the set of probabilities M?
As we admit a relative error on gambles and probabilities, and therefore also on previsions,
we should admit a relative error on the choice function as well. Let RD be defined by (recall
that fd(w) = −L(d, w))
RD = sup
d∈D
[sup fd − inf fd]
Definition 5. Let ǫ ≥ 0. A decision d in D is called an ǫ-optimal decision for the decision
problem (Ω, D,M, L) if it belongs to the set
optǫ(Ω, D,M, L) =
{
d ∈ D : (∃P ∈M)
(
sup
e∈D
EP (e)− EP (d) ≤ ǫRD
)}
Note that
optǫ(Ω, D,M, aL+ b) = optǫ(Ω, D,M, L)
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for any real numbers a and b, a > 0. In other words, optǫ(Ω, D,M, L) is invariant with respect
to positive linear transformations of utility: ǫ-optimality does not depend on our choice of utility
scale.
Clearly,
opt(Ω, D,M, L) ⊆ optǫ(Ω, D,M, L)
because
optǫ(Ω, D,M, L) ⊆ optδ(Ω, D,M, L)
whenever ǫ ≤ δ, and
opt0(Ω, D,M, L) = opt(Ω, D,M, L)
In approximating a decision problem (Ω, D,M, L), we start with a finite partition A, consider
a (possibly finite) set Mˆ such thatM∼δ Mˆ, and approximate the loss L(d, w) by a loss Lˆ(d,A)
such that L ∼ǫ Lˆ.
Theorem 6. Consider two decision problems (Ω, D,M, L) and (A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ). If L ∼ǫ Lˆ and
M∼δ Mˆ then, for any γ ≥ 0,
(1) optγ(Ω, D,M, L) ⊆ opt
γ
1−2ǫ
+2( ǫ
1−2ǫ
+δ)(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ)
and
(2) optγ(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ) ⊆ optγ(1+2ǫ)+2(ǫ+δ(1+2ǫ))(Ω, D,M, L)
Proof. We prove Eq. (1). Let d ∈ optγ(Ω, D,M, L). Then
(3) sup
e∈D
EP (fe)− EP (fd) ≤ γRD
for some P ∈M. Let Pˆ be such that P ∼δ Pˆ . Because, by Lemma 4,∣∣∣∣sup
e∈D
EPˆ (fˆe)− sup
e′∈D
EP (fe′)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
e∈D
∣∣∣EPˆ (fˆe)− EP (fe)∣∣∣
≤ sup
e∈D
[sup fˆe − inf fˆe](ǫ/(1− 2ǫ) + δ)
= (ǫ/(1− 2ǫ) + δ)RˆD(4)
it follows that
sup
e∈D
EPˆ (fˆe)− EPˆ (fˆd) ≤ sup
e∈D
EP (fe)− EPˆ (fˆd) + (ǫ/(1− 2ǫ) + δ)RˆD
and again by Lemma 4,
≤ sup
e∈D
EP (fe)− EP (fd) + 2(ǫ/(1− 2ǫ) + δ)RˆD
and by Eq. (3),
≤ γRD + 2(ǫ/(1− 2ǫ) + δ)RˆD
≤ [γ/(1− 2ǫ) + 2(ǫ/(1− 2ǫ) + δ)]RˆD
hence, d ∈ optγ/(1−2ǫ)+2(ǫ/(1−2ǫ)+δ)(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ).
Next, we prove Eq. (2). Let d ∈ optγ(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ). Then
(5) sup
e∈D
EPˆ (fˆe)− EPˆ (fˆd) ≤ γRˆD
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Because, by Lemma 4,∣∣∣∣sup
e∈D
EPˆ (fˆe)− sup
e′∈D
EP (fe′)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
e∈D
∣∣∣EPˆ (fˆe)− EP (fe)∣∣∣
≤ sup
e∈D
[sup fe − inf fe](ǫ + δ(1 + 2ǫ))
= (ǫ+ δ(1 + 2ǫ))RD(6)
we have that
sup
e∈D
EP (fe)− EP (f) ≤ sup
e∈D
EPˆ (fˆe)− EP (f) + (ǫ + δ(1 + 2ǫ))RD
and again by Lemma 4,
≤ sup
e∈D
EPˆ (fˆe)− EPˆ (fˆe) + 2(ǫ+ δ(1 + 2ǫ))RD
and by Eq. (5)
≤ γRˆD + 2(ǫ+ δ(1 + 2ǫ))RD
≤ [γ(1 + 2ǫ) + 2(ǫ+ δ(1 + 2ǫ))]RD
so d ∈ optγ(1+2ǫ)+2(ǫ+δ(1+2ǫ))(Ω, D,M, L). 
If we ignore higher order terms in γ, ǫ, and δ, then the above theorem says that when moving
from an original decision problem to an approximate decision problem, or the other way around,
with relative error ǫ in gambles and relative error δ in probabilities, the relative error in optimality
increases by 2(ǫ+ δ). For example, for small ǫ and δ the following holds, up to a small error: if
L ∼ǫ Lˆ and M∼δ Mˆ, then
opt(Ω, D,M, L) ⊆ opt2(ǫ+δ)(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ) ⊆ opt4(ǫ+δ)(Ω, D,M, L)
So, the approximate problem with relative error 2(ǫ+ δ) will contain all solutions to the original
problem with no relative error, and will, so to speak, not contain any solutions to the original
problem with relative error over 4(ǫ+ δ). Because of this property, opt2(ǫ+δ)(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ) seems
a logical choice when solving decision problems in practice.
5. Pairwise Choice
Table 2 reveals that the size of the credal set is a serious computational bottleneck. Therefore,
it is worth investigating how the size of Mˆ can be reduced, without compromising the accuracy
δ > 0. One way to this end is to restrict to pairwise comparisons, i.e. using maximality (see
Walley [18, Sec. 3.7–3.9]).
5.1. Maximality.
Definition 7. A decision d ∈ D is called a maximal decision for the decision problem (Ω, D,M, L)
if d belongs to the set
max(Ω, D,M, L) = {d ∈ D : (∀e ∈ D)(∃P ∈ M) (EP (d) ≥ EP (e))}
Denote by co(M) the convex hull of M. Obviously it holds that
max(Ω, D,M, L) = max(Ω, D, co(M), L)
because for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and any two P and Q in M, the inequalities EP (d) ≥ EP (e) and
EQ(d) ≥ EQ(e) imply the inequality
EλP+(1−λ)Q(d) ≥ EλP+(1−λ)Q(e)
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This does not hold for optimality as defined in Definition 1: assuming Ω finite, for any two
distinct subsets M andM′ of P(Ω), we can always find a set D and a loss function L such that
opt(Ω, D,M, L) 6= opt(Ω, D,M′, L) (see Kadane, Schervish, and Seidenfeld [8, Thm. 1, p. 53]).
To understand why the above notion of optimality is called maximality, consider the strict
partial ordering > on D defined by
e > d ⇐⇒ (∀P ∈M) (EP (e) > EP (d))
for any d and e in D, that is, e is strictly preferred to d if e is strictly preferred to d with respect
to every P ∈M. Then,
max(Ω, D,M, L) = {d ∈ D : (∀e ∈ D)(e 6> d)}
so max(Ω, D,M, L) elects those decisions d which are undominated with respect to >. There-
fore, maximality can be expressed through pairwise preferences only—again in contrast to
opt(Ω, D,M, L) as for instance demonstrated by Kadane, Schervish, and Seidenfeld [8, Sec. 4,
p. 51].
However, because
opt(Ω, D,M, L) ⊆ max(Ω, D,M, L)
we may interpret max(Ω, D,M, L) as an approximation to opt(Ω, D,M, L), an approximation
which discards all preferences but the pairwise ones.
Let us admit a relative error on the choice function max as well. Recall, RD = supd∈D[sup fd−
inf fd].
Definition 8. Let ǫ ≥ 0. A decision d in D is called an ǫ-maximal decision for the decision
problem (Ω, D,M, L) if it belongs to the set
maxǫ(Ω, D,M, L) = {d ∈ D : (∀e ∈ D)(∃P ∈M)(EP (e)− EP (d) ≤ ǫRD)}
5.2. Approximating Extreme Points. It turns out that we can restrict our attention to the
extreme points of the closure of the convex hull of M, with respect to the topology of pointwise
convergence on members of L(Ω). This topology is characterised by the following notion of
convergence: for every directed set (A,≤) and every net (Pα)α∈A, we have that limα Pα = P if
lim
α
EPα(f) = EP (f) for all f ∈ L(Ω)
Without further mention, I will assume this topology on P(Ω). See for instance [12] for more
information regarding nets [12, Chapter 7] and this topology [12, §28.15].
There is a nice connection between the closure ofM, denoted by cl(M), and ǫ-optimality and
ǫ-maximality.
Lemma 9. Assume that RD > 0. Let ǫ ≥ 0. For any decision problem (Ω, D,M, L), the
following equality holds:
(7) maxǫ(Ω, D, cl(M), L) =
⋂
δ>0
maxǫ+δ(Ω, D,M, L)
and if additionally D is finite, then the following equality holds as well:
(8) optǫ(Ω, D, cl(M), L) =
⋂
δ>0
optǫ+δ(Ω, D,M, L)
Proof. We start with proving Eq. (7).
Assume d ∈ maxǫ(Ω, D, cl(M), L). Consider any e ∈ D. By assumption, there is a P ∈ cl(M)
such that EP (e) − EP (d) ≤ RDǫ. Because P ∈ cl(M), there is a net (Pα ∈ M)α∈A such that
limαEPα(f) = EP (f) for all gambles f . It follows that limαEPα(e) − limαEPα(d) ≤ RDǫ.
This implies that for every δ > 0, there is an α ∈ A such that EPα(e) − EPα(f) ≤ (ǫ + δ)RD.
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So, for every δ > 0, there is a P ∈ M such that EP (e) − EP (f) ≤ (ǫ + δ)RD. Whence,
because this holds for any e ∈ D, d ∈ maxǫ+δ(Ω, D,M, L) for all δ > 0, and therefore, d ∈⋂
δ>0max
ǫ+δ(Ω, D,M, L).
Conversely, assume d ∈
⋂
δ>0max
ǫ+δ(Ω, D,M, L). Consider any e ∈ D. Then, for all δ > 0,
there is a Pδ ∈ M such that EPδ (e) − EPδ (f) ≤ (ǫ + δ)RD. Hence, for all n ∈ N, there is a
Pn ∈M such that
(9) EPn(e)− EPn(d) ≤ 1/n+ ǫRD
For any m ∈ N, consider the following closed subset of P(Ω):
Rm = cl({Pn : n ≥ m})
The collection {Rm : m ∈ N} satisfies the finite intersection property. By the Banach-Alaoglu-
Bourbaki theorem [12, §28.29(UF26)] P(Ω) is compact, and hence
R = ∩m∈NRm
is non-empty as well [12, §17.2].
Take any R ∈ R. Since each Pn ∈M, it follows that eachRm ⊆ cl(M), and hence R ∈ cl(M).
If we can show that ER(e)− ER(d) ≤ ǫRD, then d ∈ maxǫ(Ω, D, cl(M), L) is established.
Indeed, fix m ∈ N. Because R ∈ Rm, there is a net (Pnα)α∈A in {Pn : n ≥ m}—so nα ≥ m,
but nα is not necessarily an increasing function of α—such that limαEPnα (fe−fd) = ER(fe−fd).
Hence, for each γ > 0, there is an α ∈ A such that ER(e) − ER(d) ≤ EPnα (e) − EPnα (d) + γ,
and therefore by Eq. (9), ER(e) − ER(d) ≤ 1/nα + ǫRD + γ. Because this inequality holds for
every m and every γ > 0, and nα ≥ m, it follows that ER(e)− ER(d) ≤ ǫRD.
Let us now prove Eq. (8), under the additional assumption that D is finite. The proof goes
along similar lines as the one for Eq. (7).
Assume d ∈ optǫ(Ω, D, cl(M), L). By assumption, there is a P ∈ cl(M) such that EP (e) −
EP (d) ≤ RDǫ for every e ∈ D. Because P ∈ cl(M), there is a net (Pα ∈ M)α∈A such that
limαEPα(f) = EP (f) for all gambles f . In particular, there is a net (Pα ∈ M)α∈A such that
limαEPα(e) − limαEPα(d) ≤ RDǫ for every e ∈ D. So, for every e ∈ D and δ > 0, there is an
αe,δ ∈ A such that EPα(e) − EPα(f) ≤ (ǫ + δ)RD for all α ≥ αe,δ. Because D is finite, there is
an αδ such that αδ ≥ αe,δ for all e ∈ D. Hence, for every δ > 0, there is a αδ ∈ A such that
EPαδ (e) − EPαδ (f) ≤ (ǫ + δ)RD for every e ∈ D. Whence, because Pαδ ∈ M, it follows that
d ∈ optǫ+δ(Ω, D,M, L) for all δ > 0, and therefore, d ∈
⋂
δ>0 opt
ǫ+δ(Ω, D,M, L).
Conversely, assume d ∈
⋂
δ>0 opt
ǫ+δ(Ω, D,M, L). Then, for all δ > 0, there is a Pδ ∈M such
that EPδ (e)−EPδ (f) ≤ (ǫ+ δ)RD for every e ∈ D. Hence, for all n ∈ N, there is a Pn ∈M such
that for every e ∈ D
(10) EPn(e)− EPn(d) ≤ 1/n+ ǫRD
Now choose any R in
R = ∩m∈N cl({Pn : n ≥ m})
Similarly as before, it can be established that R is non-empty and that R ∈ cl(M). If we can
show that ER(e) − ER(d) ≤ ǫRD for all e ∈ D, then d indeed belongs to optǫ(Ω, D, cl(M), L)
and the desired result is established.
Indeed, because R ∈ cl({Pn : n ≥ m}), for every e ∈ D, there is a net (Pnα,e)α∈A in {Pn : n ≥
m}—so nα,e ≥ m—such that limαEPnα,e (fe − fd) = ER(fe − fd). Hence, for every e ∈ D and
every γ > 0, there is an α ∈ A such that ER(e) − ER(d) ≤ EPnα,e (e) − EPnα,e (d) + γ, and
therefore by Eq. (10), ER(e)−ER(d) ≤ 1/nα,e+ǫRD+γ. Because this inequality holds for every
m and every γ > 0, and nα,e ≥ m, it follows that ER(e)− ER(d) ≤ ǫRD for every e ∈ D. 
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In particular, assuming RD > 0, if for any δ > ǫ > 0
maxǫ(Ω, D,M, L) = maxδ(Ω, D,M, L)
then
maxǫ(Ω, D,M, L) = maxǫ(Ω, D, cl(M), L)
A similar result holds for the optǫ operator for finite D.
As a special case, Lemma 9 implies an interesting connection between maximality and ǫ-
maximality:
Corollary 10. Assume that RD > 0. For any decision problem (Ω, D,M, L), the following
equality holds:
max(Ω, D, cl(M), L) =
⋂
ǫ>0
maxǫ(Ω, D,M, L)
Again, a similar result holds for optimality and ǫ-optimality, in case D is finite.
In the following theorem, assume that 0 < ǫ < 1/2.
Theorem 11. Consider two decision problems (Ω, D,M, L) and (A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ). Assume that
RD > 0. If L ∼ǫ Lˆ and ext(cl(co(M))) ∼δ Mˆ then, for any γ ≥ 0,
maxγ(Ω, D,M, L) ⊆
⋂
η>0
maxη+
γ
1−2ǫ+2(
ǫ
1−2ǫ+δ)(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ)(11)
maxγ(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ) ⊆
⋂
η>0
maxη+γ(1+2ǫ)+2(ǫ+δ(1+2ǫ))(Ω, D,M, L)(12)
Proof. First, note that
maxγ(Ω, D,M, L) = maxγ(Ω, D, co(M), L)
⊆ maxγ(Ω, D, cl(co(M)), L)
and by convexity of cl(co(M)) [12, §26.23] and the Krein-Milman theorem [6, p. 74], the closed
convex hull of ext(cl(co(M))) is cl(co(M)), so
= maxγ(Ω, D, cl(co(ext(cl(co(M))))), L)
and now by Corollary 10,
= ∩η>0max
γ+η(Ω, D, co(ext(cl(co(M)))), L)
= ∩η>0max
γ+η(Ω, D, ext(cl(co(M))), L)
Now apply the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 6 to recover Eq. (11).
To establish Eq. (12), again use the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 6,
maxγ(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ) ⊆ maxγ(1+2ǫ)+2(ǫ+δ(1+2ǫ))(Ω, D, ext(cl(co(M))), L)
⊆ maxγ(1+2ǫ)+2(ǫ+δ(1+2ǫ))(Ω, D, cl(co(ext(cl(co(M))))), L)
and again by the Krein-Milman theorem [6, p. 74], the closed convex hull of ext(cl(co(M))) is
cl(co(M)), so
= maxγ(1+2ǫ)+2(ǫ+δ(1+2ǫ))(Ω, D, cl(co(M)), L)
=
⋂
η>0
maxη+γ(1+2ǫ)+2(ǫ+δ(1+2ǫ))(Ω, D, co(M), L)
=
⋂
η>0
maxη+γ(1+2ǫ)+2(ǫ+δ(1+2ǫ))(Ω, D,M, L)
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
Again, if we ignore higher order terms in γ, ǫ, and δ, then the above theorem says that when
moving from the original decision problem to the approximate decision problem, with relative
error ǫ in gambles and relative error δ in probabilities, the relative error in maximality increases
by 2(ǫ + δ). Hence, for small ǫ and δ the following holds, up to a small error: if L ∼ǫ Lˆ and
ext(cl(co(M))) ∼δ Mˆ, then
max(Ω, D,M, L) ⊆ max2(ǫ+δ)(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ) ⊆ max4(ǫ+δ)(Ω, D,M, L)
Again, max2(ǫ+δ)(A, D,Mˆ, Lˆ) seems a logical choice when calculating maximal decisions in prac-
tice.
6. Conclusion and Remarks
With this paper, I hope to have consolidated at least part of our every day intuition when
approximating decision problems involving sets of probabilities, for instance when those problems
have to be solved by computer.
One result is quite depressing: Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 seem to tell us that except in the
simplest cases, any approximation will need too many resources to be of any practical value, as
demonstrated by Table 1 and Table 2.
Fortunately, not all is lost. If we resort to pairwise comparison, we may restrict ourselves
to the extreme points of the closure of the convex hull of the credal set, which can be much
smaller than the original credal set. Closing the credal set only has an arbitrary small effect on
maximality, and in part for this reason, it turns out that approximating extreme points suffices
when restricting to pairwise preference.
I wish to emphasise that the bounds on the cardinalities of the approximating partition and
the approximating credal set are only upper bounds under very weak assumptions. These bounds
are only attained in extreme situations. In many cases the credal set and the loss function have
additional structure which may allow for much lower upper bounds.
In case the problem has sufficient structure, an alternative approach is to develop algorithms
which do not need to traverse the complete credal set (or an approximation thereof) to compute
the optimal solution. The imprecise Dirichlet model has already been given considerable attention
in this direction [7].
Obermeier and Augustin [10] have described a method to approximate decision problems
by applying Lucen˜os’ adaptive discretisation method to either all elements of the credal set
(so the partition varies with the distribution), or on a reference distribution of that set. This
type of approximation aims to preserve the first r moments of a distribution. Although precise
convergence results and bounds on the precision of this approximation have not yet been proven,
examples have shown that this method can yield good results in practice.
Finally, another approach could consist of sampling elements from the credal set, for instance
through Monte-Carlo techniques, and solve a classical decision problem for each of these elements.
If the sample s from Mˆ is large enough, then—since
⋃
P∈s opt(A, D, P, L) = opt(A, D, s, L)—
hopefully
opt(A, D,M, L) =
⋃
P∈s
opt(A, D, P, L)
The question how large a sample we need to ensure convergence is definitely worth further
investigation.
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Appendix A. Discretisation Of The Standard Simplex In Rn
In this appendix a simple discretisation of ∆n, the standard simplex in Rn, is studied—these
results are not new and are in fact related to well known notions from combinatorics, in particular
multisets [15]. The standard simplex ∆n is defined as
∆n = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, |x|1 = 1}
where | · |1 denotes the 1-norm, i.e. |x|1 =
∑n
i=1 |xi|.
For any non-zero natural number N , let ∆nN denote the following finite subset of ∆
n:
∆nN = {m/N : m ∈ N
n, |m|1 = N}
(above, N is the set of natural numbers including 0).
Lemma 12. The cardinality of ∆nN is
(
N+n−1
N
)
.
Proof. There is an obvious one-to-one and onto correspondence between ∆nN and all multisets
of cardinality N with elements taken from {1, . . . , n}—for any m/N ∈ ∆nN , interpret mi as the
multiplicity of i. The number of all such multisets is precisely
(
N+n−1
N
)
(see Stanley [15]). 
Lemma 13. For every x in ∆n there is a y in ∆nN such that
|x− y|1 < n/N
Proof. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let mi be the unique natural number such that xi ∈ [mi/N, (mi+
1)/N), or equivalently, let mi be the largest natural number such that mi/N ≤ xi. Define
M =
∑n
i=1mi. Then, M ≤ N < M + n since M/N = |m/N |1 ≤ |x|1 = 1 and (M + n)/N =
|(m+ 1)/N |1 > |x|1 = 1. Define
ei =
{
1 if i ∈ {1, . . . , N −M}
0 if i ∈ {N −M + 1, . . . , n}
and let y = (m+ e)/N . Note that y ∈ ∆nN because |y|1 = |m+ e|1/N = (M + (N −M))/N = 1.
Finally,
|x− y|1 =
N−M∑
i=1
|xi −
mi+1
N |+
n∑
i=N−M+1
|xi −
mi
N | < n/N
as |xi −
mi+1
N | ≤ 1/N and |xi −
mi
N | < 1/N . 
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